

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/PV.246
8 March 1966
ENGLISH

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND FORTY-SIXTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 8 March 1966, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI

(Italy)

cdc.66-217
66-10105

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PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil :

Mr. A. CORREA do LAGO
Mr. G. de CARVALHO SILOS
Mr. D. SILVEIRA da MOTA
Mr. C. H. PAULINO PRATES

Bulgaria :

Mr. C. LUKANOV
Mr. B. KONSTANTINOV
Mr. D. POPOV
Mr. D. KOSTOV

Burma :

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada :

Mr. E. L. M. BURNS
Mr. C. J. MARSHALL
Mr. P. D. LEE

Czechoslovakia :

Mr. Z. CERNIK
Mr. V. VAJNAR
Mr. R. KLEIN

Ethiopia :

Mr. A. ABERRA
Mr. A. ZELLEKE
Mr. B. ASSFAW
Mr. A. MIKAEL

India :

Mr. V. C. TRIVEDI
Mr. K. P. LUKOSE
Mr. K. P. JAIN

Italy :

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. G. P. TOZZOLI
Mr. S. AVETTA
Mr. F. SORO

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Mexico : Mr. A. GOMEZ ROBLEDO
Mr. M. TELLO MACIAS

Nigeria : Mr. G. O. IJEWERE
Mr. O. O. ADESOLA

Poland : Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI
Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Romania : Mr. V. DUMITRESCU
Mr. C. UNGUREANU
Mr. A. COROIANU

Sweden : Mrs. A. MYRDAL
Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD
Mr. R. BOMAN
Mr. J. PRAWITZ

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics : Mr. S. K. TSARAPKIN
Mr. O. A. GRINEVSKY
Mr. M. A. OZADOVSKY
Mr. G. K. EFIMOV

United Arab Republic : Mr. H. KHALLAF
Mr. A. OSMAN
Mr. M. KASSEM
Mr. A. A. SALAM

United Kingdom : Sir Harold BEELLEY
Mr. J. G. TAHOURDIN
Miss E. J. M. RICHARDSON
Mr. M. J. F. DUNCAN

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United States of America :

Mr. A. S. FISHER

Mr. C. H. TIMBERLAKE

Mr. A. J. GOLDBERG

Mr. D. S. MACDONALD

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General :

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General :

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Italy) (translation from French): I declare open the two hundred and forty-sixth plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. GOMEZ ROBLEDO (Mexico) (translation from Spanish): I should first of all like to express my delegation's pleasure at seeing once more among us Mr. Protitch, representative of the Secretary-General, and Mr. Fisher, representing the United States of America.

It was certainly a felicitous move by our co-Chairmen to put forward their joint proposal (ENDC/PV.244, p.4) that the Committee should devote at least the current week of its present session to a general discussion of the various collateral measures to check the arms race and reduce international tension. Within the general context which forms the essential framework of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons— still our most pressing objective at the moment --, such an approach, however condensed or generalized, is bound to contribute towards building the treaty on a firmer basis. We shall revert to it with renewed energy once we are aware, or again become aware, of the links which are bound to exist between the treaty and the other steps required to secure general and complete disarmament.

In this connexion it seems appropriate, before embarking on any specific considerations, to recall the terms of resolution DC/225 adopted by the Disarmament Commission at its meeting on 15 June 1965. After recommending the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to give special priority to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the resolution added that this should involve "giving close attention to the various suggestions that agreement could be facilitated by adopting a programme of certain related measures" (ENDC/149). It is thus the Members of the United Nations as a whole, as represented in the Disarmament Commission, who have laid on us the imperative duty of co-ordination; and we must act accordingly.

You will all be familiar with the receptive attitude the Mexican delegation has invariably taken towards the different collateral disarmament measures proposed at various times and in varying circumstances by the nuclear Powers and their respective allies or by the non-aligned countries, both in this Committee and elsewhere. On this question, as on everything directly affecting the well-being of humanity —and

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what could affect it more than disarmament?— we make no distinction between countries, Powers or groups. Although at times we may have laid particular emphasis on certain measures, that is only because we have thought them more urgent or more feasible than others, and not because we have been opposed in principle to any one of the many steps suggested.

With this in mind, and subject to the proviso that the list I am going to enumerate is in no way exhaustive, my delegation has always been especially sympathetic towards the adoption of all or any of the following measures: freezing of strategic nuclear vehicles; stoppage of production of fissionable materials for arms manufacture and gradual reduction of the armaments industry; reduction of armed forces and military budgets which are clearly out of proportion to national defence requirements; taking of steps to prevent the risk of war, particularly nuclear war, by accident, miscalculation or surprise attack; and lastly the noble idea, originally put forward by one of the non-aligned countries of this Committee, of embodying the total prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons in an international treaty (A/RES/1653(XVI)). Whenever any of these subjects appears or reappears in our discussions, we shall be ready to join with you all in a common effort to arrive at fair, balanced and constructive solutions.

As far as the present is concerned, however, I must be expressing not only my own ideas but those of all of us in saying that the question of extending the partial treaty on the prohibition of nuclear tests (ENDC/100/Rev.1) to underground tests is as urgent as that of the non-proliferation treaty. This is fully borne out by the various resolutions of the Disarmament Commission and the General Assembly which recommend with equal emphasis that both matters should be given special priority in our discussions.

In my last statement, made at the meeting on 22 February, I stressed that the two questions were closely linked and inseparable (ENDC/PV.242, p.9). I have no wish to appear discourteous by unnecessarily repeating what I said on that occasion. I would simply add that this idea, far from being original or an invention of ours, is to be found in resolution 1649 (XVI) of the General Assembly, which states that "an agreement prohibiting all nuclear weapon tests ... would inhibit the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries ...". If we may be allowed to make our own comment on the text of the resolution, the agreement would do so because, if a

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non-nuclear Power decided to become a nuclear Power on its own, it would presumably be unable to do so without testing the arms it was manufacturing, and it could not lawfully test them if there were a treaty prohibiting such tests in every possible environment.

Secondly, a fully comprehensive treaty on the cessation of nuclear tests would also prevent the nuclear Powers from perfecting weapons of this kind, by stopping them from testing any new weapons. It would therefore restrict the type of proliferation we have called vertical or intra-spatial: that is to say, proliferation within a given territory instead of from one territory to another. It would not, however, prevent all forms of proliferation, since the nuclear Powers could go on increasing their stocks of existing weapons, the production of which would presumably entail no fresh testing. In short, the test-ban treaty would complement but not replace the non-proliferation treaty, so that the success of either treaty would not make up for the failure of the other.

Apart from its relationship with other complementary instruments, and considered strictly on its own, the Moscow Treaty must be extended to the physical environment which its provisions do not yet cover -- that is, underground -- and must not apply merely to tests under water, in the atmosphere and in outer space. The preamble to the Treaty itself imposes this duty by committing its signatories to continue negotiations in order to turn the partial treaty into a total one; and the whole of mankind demands that this should be done. It is no longer any exaggeration to say this: in every tongue, every man and woman throughout the world, aghast with horror at the genocidal and humanicidal qualities of nuclear weapons ("homicidal" is now an archaic and inadequate word), is demanding that their manufacture and testing should cease once and for all. Albert Schweitzer spoke with the powerful voice of the human conscience when he said: "Mankind is imperilled by the tests. Mankind insists that they stop, and has every right to do so."^{1/}

^{1/} Peace or Atomic War? p.12. London: Adam and Charles Black, 1958.

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We are aware of the technical objection to the extension or universalization of the Moscow Treaty, ratione materiae, which consists in the difficulty of detecting and identifying movements in the earth's crust in such a way as to distinguish with absolute certainty between those caused by earthquake or seaquake and those artificially produced by a nuclear explosion. According to one of the major nuclear Powers the difference can be established by purely national identification systems, whereas the other maintains that there would be doubtful cases which could not be decided without an inspection in situ. This in turn, in the former Power's view, would involve a serious risk of espionage and thus represent a threat to its safety.

This, then, is where the difference resides; but, thanks to the extraordinary progress of seismology, the difference seems to be narrowing every day. In this connexion, we should like to express once more our appreciation of the admirable efforts of the Government and scientists of Sweden to promote the so-called "detection club" (ENDC/154), a kind of central bureau for co-ordinating or exchanging data between the countries at present possessing the most advanced seismological stations, so as to hasten the date, which now seems fairly close, when every movement in the earth's surface, whatever its cause, can be fully detected and identified.

The United Kingdom delegation's memorandum of 9 September 1965 is also, in our opinion, an illuminating document. It states that "there still remains a residual number of seismic events ... that would be unidentifiable by remote seismological observations alone ..." (ENDC/155, p.3). Our comment on this document when the subject was discussed in the First Committee of the General Assembly was as follows:

"This question of 'residual number' implies to us ... that the great majority of movements, be they natural or artificial, on the surface of the earth or in the sub-soil, are at present detectable and identifiable."

(A/C.1/PV.1386, p.17).

On this basis we thought at the time and continue to think that, since the margin of uncertainty is so narrow, the nuclear Powers ought to make reciprocal concessions: one should resign itself to the smaller explosions remaining within the margin of

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uncertainty, and the other to periodical inspections taking place under conditions which would not compromise its security. As to these conditions, it is easy to understand the misgivings one Power may feel at having inspectors on its territory who are subjects of a rival Power. The difficulty could perhaps be obviated by agreeing that the inspecting team should consist entirely of geologists or seismologists of recognized standing who are nationals of neutral or non-aligned countries.

The best solution would certainly be impersonal inspection by means of instruments located in situ, such as the "black boxes" which we heard so much about at one time, but since that method failed, for reasons which we need not go into now, we cannot visualize any other possibility than sporadic and therefore personal inspection, by persons whose nationality and scientific eminence would provide a safeguard against their compromising their important duties by associating with intelligence services or spying operations.

Matters as serious as those now involved, or even more serious, such as formal questions of sovereignty, territorial claims and so on, are submitted by States to judges or arbitrators for final decision. Surely it should be also possible to find a disinterested third party -- the tiers indifférent mentioned by Pascal with specific reference to international conciliation -- to act in the nuclear field. We think that, in the same way as a list of possible arbitrators was deposited with the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs when international arbitration began -- since the Permanent Court of Arbitration was originally only a list -- a list of possible inspectors could be drawn up for the purpose which now concerns us. It would comprise the most eminent names in seismology and related sciences, of persons of irreproachable integrity, and could be deposited with the Secretary-General (who might also co-operate in preparing it), so that the parties could have recourse to this select team as occasion required and choose inspectors who offered them every guarantee of competence and integrity.

We put this forward as a modest suggestion for the Committee to consider, not because we look upon it as an "open sesame" to success, but merely so as to leave no avenue unexplored and no idea uninvestigated on this vital question which has been awaiting a satisfactory solution for so long.

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Only in the last resort (and we would stress this point), if the nuclear Powers are absolutely unable to agree on an inspection procedure acceptable to all of them, should we, as we see it, examine the feasibility of extending the prohibitions of the Moscow Treaty to all underground tests which are known to lie beyond the present threshold of uncertainty and are therefore, beyond all risk of contradiction, fully detectable and identifiable by national seismological stations. This, as we said in New York, is the old idea of the "threshold" (A/C.1/PV.1386, p.17) -- old in the sense of venerable, but not of feeble -- which at least gives us an opportunity of offering some measure of immediate relief to the anxiety felt by the millions of invisible but very real spectators outside this room who cannot wait for seismology to reach a peak of absolute perfection before they are released from the nightmare of a nuclear war.

If agreement of this kind can be reached on a treaty on the partial prohibition of underground tests -- or better still perhaps, an additional protocol to the present Moscow Treaty -- we think the text should include a mandatory provision for the periodical review of the treaty, maybe once a year -- not of course to enable the parties to withdraw from the obligations they have entered into, but simply, as seismology advances, to push back the threshold of uncertainty until the concept can be abandoned altogether and the treaty can be given the completeness it deserves by a prohibition of all nuclear tests in all environments. Once again, this is only half a solution, though of course better than none at all; but that does not mean that we can rest content with it and relax our efforts towards achieving our ultimate aim.

The General Assembly clearly and unequivocally stated in its resolution 1762 (XVII) (ENDC/63) that it "condemns all nuclear weapon tests". That being so, how can we with a clear conscience allow this moral cancer, which undermines our co-existence today and may destroy it tomorrow, to go on shamefully proliferating underground in the form of nuclear weapons? How can we tolerate the continued existence of something which the conscience of humanity has so clearly condemned?

Never can there have been a better reason for saying that where there is a will there is a way. The will can and must fill the narrow gap still separating the Powers' positions -- the gap between inspection and identification, between science and politics. After all, the obstacle we face is one of time, not one of substance,

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and in these cases time expands or contracts at the dictates of the human will, not of the laws of nature. If all of us, and especially those who are responsible for this situation, wish it, we shall very soon —perhaps even tomorrow —have closed the lamentable gap which the partial treaty on the prohibition of nuclear tests still contains. If not, as a French writer has said, the tripartite Moscow agreement will go down as one of the most sterile treaties in diplomatic history (Raymond Aron, "Espoir et Inquiétude", Le Figaro, 6 August 1963). There is still time —but not if we persist in this apathy -- to expand this treaty as it should be expanded and thereby make it as fully effective as it ought to be and as humanity expects it to be.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): At today's meeting of the Committee the Soviet delegation intends to state its view on other partial measures which, if carried out without delay, would lead to a considerable improvement of the international situation and substantially reduce the threat of a nuclear war. Various types of partial measures were mentioned in our previous debates, and today the Committee has no lack of specific proposals. Therefore the crux of the matter lies, not in devising any new proposals, but in concentrating our efforts and showing goodwill so as to reach agreement on the measures which have been submitted to the Committee for its consideration.

We believe that the Committee should give priority to the consideration of those partial measures, which, if agreed upon, would lead to a relaxation of international tension and to a real lessening of the threat of a nuclear war, so that as a result of our work we could achieve progress towards real, not illusory, nuclear disarmament. The present international situation calls for immediate consideration of such measures and for agreement to be reached on them as a matter of the greatest urgency.

One of these urgent measures is the elimination of foreign bases on the territories of other countries and the withdrawal of foreign troops from these territories. The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, as well as the non-aligned States -- indeed, the overwhelming majority of the countries of the world -- have for a number of years insistently called for the rapid solution of this problem at various international meetings and conferences, including the Eighteen-Nation Committee and the General Assembly of the United Nations.

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The present situation in the world and recent events in South-East Asia, Africa and Latin America have made the questions of the elimination of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other countries particularly urgent. In his recent message to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Kosygin, stressed that --

"The events which are now taking place in the world convincingly show that foreign military bases and armed forces in the territories of other countries represent a serious threat to world peace. These bases, which as a rule comprise nuclear weapons, greatly increase the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war". (ENDC/167.p.3)

Many delegations in this Committee and at the United Nations General Assembly, as well as in other international forums, have already pointed out on a number of occasions that the presence of foreign military bases and troops in the territories of other countries is one of the main sources of international tension and military conflicts.

During discussion of this question it has often been pointed out that United States, United Kingdom, Portuguese and other troops and military bases located in foreign territories, in countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, represent an extremely dangerous tool of colonial policy, of the policy of neo-colonialism and the imperialistic policy of enslaving and subjugating young independent States. Foreign military bases are strongholds for interfering in the domestic affairs of other States, and springboards for the waging of so-called local wars -- that offspring of imperialistic policy. It is from these bases that networks of plots and provocation are woven to stifle the freedom and independence of peoples who have shaken off the colonial yoke and set forth upon the road of independent development. This characteristic of the part played by foreign military bases and foreign troops in the territories of other countries is confirmed every day and every minute.

The imperialistic role of foreign bases in the territories of other countries, and first and foremost the United States bases, which are the most numerous, is revealed quite clearly in South-East Asia, Latin America, Africa, and the Near and Middle East. It is precisely from the United States bases situated in South Viet-Nam,

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Thailand, Okinawa and other areas that the United States aggression is to a large extent being carried out in Viet-Nam and barbarous bombing raids are being launched against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and certain parts of Laos.

In pursuing this policy of intensifying and expanding armed intervention in the affairs of the peoples of South-East Asia, the Pentagon is taking steps to construct new military bases and to enlarge old ones in South-East Asia, especially Thailand, the basin of the Indian Ocean, and other parts of the world. This is what the American magazine Newsweek wrote on this subject on 31 January this year that the Eastern borders of Asia were today the scene of one of the largest concentrations of American armed forces since the Second World War; that from Thailand to Korea conveyor belts and pneumatic drills, bulldozers and steam-rollers, excavators and stone-crushers thundered the night through, restoring old, grass-grown airstrips, establishing new ones and equipping harbours along the jungle-covered coast. The magazine goes on to say that in the present year alone the Pentagon is planning to spend \$ 1.4 billion on building new bases and improving existing bases in Asia.

Since the war the United States has covered with a vast network of its military bases and installations the territories of dozens of large and small States in Asia, Africa, Latin America and Western Europe. In these areas large United States military bases alone number no less than 400. Approximately one-third of the armed forces of the United States are stationed outside its national borders. Along the coasts of Asia, Africa and Latin America, especially in the areas where the peoples are struggling for their freedom and independence against imperialism and colonialism, the greater part of the United States Navy is deployed, armed with all kinds of missiles for combating these national liberation movements of the peoples.

In this matter the closest ally of the United States, the United Kingdom, does not lag far behind. It is well known that more than half of the British armed forces are stationed outside the national borders of the United Kingdom, at military bases of various kinds scattered throughout the world. At the end of 1965 the United Kingdom Government began to carry out its "East of Suez" military strategic plans providing for the construction of new military bases and fortifications in the Indian Ocean area and the Persian Gulf. The United

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Kingdom intends to carry out this programme with the help of the United States, which has willingly responded to this proposal and is prepared to co-operate enthusiastically in this matter. The comments in the Western press leave no shadow of doubt concerning the purposes of the construction of new bases "east of Suez". According to the Washington Post, the series of island bases to be established will considerably increase the possibility of deploying armed forces rapidly, in case of need, over an area extending from East Africa through India to Singapore. The imperialistic character of these plans is self-evident.

For this reason it is no mere coincidence that in many countries of the world there is an increasing and intensified demand for the elimination of foreign military bases and for the withdrawal of troops from the territories of other countries as a dangerous evil, as hotbeds of the threat of war, and as the tools of a colonialist and imperialist policy. In addition to the socialist countries, the overwhelming majority of the non-aligned countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America demand the elimination of military bases and the withdrawal of troops from the territories of other countries. The participants in the Second Conference of Heads of States or Governments of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Cairo in October 1964 and attended by representatives of some fifty countries of Asia, Africa, Latin America and Europe, declared the full support of the Conference "to the countries which are seeking to secure the evacuation of foreign bases on their territory", and called upon "all States maintaining troops and bases in other countries to remove them forthwith".

(A/5763, p.25)

During the work of the nineteenth and twentieth sessions of the United Nations General Assembly, and also at meetings of the United Nations Disarmament Commission in April-June 1965, the representatives of many countries firmly insisted on the elimination of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other countries, emphasizing that these bases are established to suppress national liberation movements, as strongholds of colonialism, and as a military means of maintaining neo-colonialistic domination in the young States of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

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At the twentieth session of the General Assembly the representative of the United Arab Republic, Mr. Fahmy, made a statement concerning in particular foreign military bases in Africa, in which he said:

"... all foreign bases -- air, military depots or otherwise -- should be dismantled. In this connexion there is a two-fold obligation: one lies on the foreign Power, and the other lies upon the African country. As to the foreign Power, it should relinquish its ambitious imperialistic designs and, accordingly, depart from the African soil. As to the African State, it is under the obligation to rid itself of these foreign military bases". (A/C.1/PV.1389, p.17)

The General Assembly at its twentieth session supported the idea of the dismantling of foreign bases in the territories of other countries. It adopted, by an overwhelming majority, an important resolution requesting the colonial Powers to dismantle the military bases installed in colonial territories and to refrain from establishing new ones (A/RES/2105 (XX)). Thus the demand for the dismantling of foreign bases in the territories of other countries, that dangerous tool of colonial and imperialistic policy, has received universal support and must be carried out by all those who have such bases.

Pressure on the colonial and imperialist Powers in this respect is continuing to grow with such force that they can no longer carry on their affairs with impunity as they have done hitherto. Evidence of this is provided by the White Paper on Defence Questions recently published by the Government of the United Kingdom, which announces its decision to evacuate the military base at Aden in 1968 and not to keep British military equipment or installations in any independent country against the wishes of that country.

Of course we have no illusions about the results of this verbal assurance by the United Kingdom Government, since we are all well aware that the colonial, imperialist Powers still have sufficiently powerful means at their disposal and use various methods to compel such countries to conclude appropriate agreements on military bases and on the presence of their forces in the territory of such independent States; or they manoeuvre in such a way that territories of interest to them are isolated into so-called "independent" units; and in this way the whole

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meaning of such promises as those contained in the United Kingdom Government's White Paper is reduced to nought. But let us not make conjectures; what happens in practice will be the only criterion of the extent to which the United Kingdom Government will apply even this half-hearted approach in order to dismantle immediately its bases in the territories of other countries.

In this regard it is impossible not to mention also the flagrant violation of national sovereignty and the will of the people committed by the existence of a United States military and naval base at Guantanamo in Cuba, where it is maintained against the clearly-expressed will of the Cuban people and despite the protests of the Cuban Government, which demands that the United States military base in this territory should be dismantled. According to the message from the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Kosygin, to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament,

"The Soviet Union is of the opinion that the Eighteen-Nation Committee should consider the question of the complete elimination of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of troops from foreign territories, so as to rid the world of these dangerous hotbeds of war, colonialism and aggression". (ENDC/167, p.3)

The implementation of this long overdue and important measure would have a very favourable effect on the course of events in the world and on the solution of other very important international problems.

We have once again been reminded of the serious threat to the well-being and security of the peoples and to peace throughout the world and of the great risk to which the nations are exposed in connexion with the presence of foreign military bases and troops in the territories of other countries by the recent crash of the United States B-52 bomber carrying nuclear weapons which took place on the southern coast of Spain on 17 January this year. This bomber, carrying four hydrogen bombs, took off from an American military base in Spain which the United States has now turned into a vast arsenal of weapons of mass destruction. As a result of a collision in the air between this United States bomber and a KC-135 refuelling aircraft, both aircraft crashed. The detonators

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of two of the hydrogen bombs exploded, the bombs disintegrated, and a considerable densely-populated coastal area of Spain was radioactively contaminated. As a result of one of the hydrogen bombs having fallen into the Mediterranean Sea off Almeria, the threat of contamination of other districts and of the open sea was created.

According to the United States newspaper New York Herald-Tribune, Mr. Manuel Fraga Iribarne, the Minister of Information and Tourism of Spain, declared at Madrid on 1 March this year that, as a result of the accidental dropping of United States hydrogen bombs in Spain, no less than 2,000 persons had been exposed to radioactive contamination; although, he added, they had not received a dangerous amount of radiation. Approximately at the same time Professor Otero Navascuéz, Chairman of the Spanish Atomic Energy Committee, said that traces of radioactivity had been found in some 6,000 tons of topsoil taken from an area of over six hectares near the village of Palomares, and that the earth would therefore be sent to the United States and destroyed at special installations in that country. Incidentally, the State Department of the United States was obliged to recognize this fact in its statement of 1 March of this year. That is the real situation. Quite naturally, this accident to a United States bomber carrying nuclear bombs has aroused serious anxiety among European and other peoples for their safety and well-being.

But take a look at the behaviour of the United States in this important matter. In view of the extremely dangerous consequences of this incident involving United States hydrogen bombs, the Soviet Government sent an aide-mémoire to the Government of the United States on 16 February drawing its attention to the danger of radioactive contamination of a considerable area because "the detonator of at least one of these bombs exploded". The aide-mémoire of the Soviet Government states that:

"... the immediate discontinuance of flights by aircraft carrying nuclear weapons beyond the limits of national borders and the strict observance of the international agreements prohibiting the radioactive contamination of man's environment answer to the interests of the prevention of dangerous accidents and incidents likely to involve grave consequences for peoples, and to the interests of peace." (ENDC/169, p.3)

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It would seem that a country whose actions had given rise to a situation so fraught with danger to the well-being, health and lives of the inhabitants of an extensive area would treat the matter with a full sense of responsibility and would respond positively and constructively to the proposal contained in the aforesaid aide-mémoire of the Soviet Government. But that was not how the United States Government decided to act. In its answering aide-mémoire of 25 February (ENDC/170) it took the course of bluntly denying or ignoring completely obvious facts. The assertion in the United States aide-mémoire that there was no radioactive contamination contradicts official communications from the Spanish authorities as well as communications from Washington.

Despite the measures taken by the United States authorities in the Palomares area to maintain the strictest secrecy about this incident, it has now become known for certain that the detonators of two of the United States hydrogen bombs exploded. As a result of these explosions the bombs disintegrated and the fissionable materials contained in these hydrogen bombs were scattered by the force of the explosion over the area where they fell. The area was contaminated by the radioactive emanation from these scattered fissionable materials. This information from the site of the accident was so widely publicized that many weeks after the accident Washington was compelled to confirm it officially.

But if the radioactive materials were scattered on the surface of the soil outside the special safety containers, then it follows that, as long as these materials were there, there took place an intensive process of radioactive contamination of everything in this area, animate and inanimate. In the light of these facts, how is it possible to deny that there was radioactive contamination in the area of the accident, as is done in the United States document? If there was no radioactive contamination, it may well be asked why the entire tomato crop in this area was destroyed. If there was no radioactive contamination, why were American soldiers working in the area where the United States bomber and the hydrogen bombs fell, dressed in white safety overalls and high rubber boots, and why did they wear special masks on their faces? Why were over 6,000 tons of topsoil in the area of the accident taken to the United States to be buried there in specially constructed places for the purpose of burying radioactive waste? If there was no radioactive contamination, why were 2,000 Spaniards tested for contamination?

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The reports which appeared on the results of these tests were cautious enough not to deny outright that the people examined had received any radioactive irradiation. The reports merely stated that the people examined had allegedly not received a "dangerous amount" -- I draw your attention to the phrase "dangerous amount" -- of irradiation. Information from the site of the accident which has percolated into the press sheds light on the situation as it really is. The local inhabitants are greatly perturbed by the present situation, and the future frightens them and fills them with dread. They say that, after dangerous radioactivity had been detected, the shoes and clothing of some of them had to be burnt. Nevertheless, it was precisely in those contaminated clothes that for three days they had already been mingling with their families without suspecting anything, and playing in a carefree manner with their children. At that time no one had told them about an atomic bomb or about radioactivity. They are now quite legitimately wondering who can assure them that their children will not at some time begin to suffer from the harmful effects of this irradiation?

The denials in document ENDC/170 that there was any radioactive contamination of the surrounding seas are equally hollow and unsubstantiated. After all, the fourth hydrogen bomb, which fell into the Mediterranean near Almeria, has still not been found, although the search for it has continued for seven weeks. This bomb is lying somewhere at the bottom of the sea, emitting radioactivity and contaminating the water. And all this is gradually spreading further and further, carrying the danger to other areas.

It is enough to draw attention to all these facts to see the irresponsibility of those who are trying to deny the obvious danger to the peoples of other countries that is always implicit in flights of bombers carrying nuclear weapons beyond their national borders.

The United States argues that these flights of United States aircraft carrying nuclear weapons beyond its borders over the territories of European countries and of States in other parts of the world are carried out because of the threat of a nuclear attack by the Soviet Union; that is what is said in the United States document. Incidentally, it should be noted that these flights with nuclear bombs on board are in

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many cases accompanied by illegal intrusion into the air space of other States without their knowledge or permission, whereby the generally-accepted rules of international law are also violated. This aspect of the matter in itself deserves to be specially examined.

But at present I wish to speak of something else. As we have already said more than once, the Soviet Union firmly adheres to the principle of the peaceful co-existence of States, irrespective of their political and economic systems and of their social structure. This is the fundamental principle of the foreign policy of the Soviet State, and none of the responsible political leaders of the world can have any doubt that the Soviet Union has no intention of attacking anyone today, tomorrow, in a month, in a year or in ten years. The threat with which the Americans are trying to intimidate their allies does not exist in fact, for the Soviet Union does not threaten anyone with its nuclear forces, but on the contrary proposes to carry out the most radical nuclear disarmament without delay, by destroying all nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. The United States is opposed to this.

So the threat with which the Americans are trying to frighten the States of the so-called "free world", is a hypothetical threat -- frankly speaking, an illusory, imaginary threat. But the threat inherent in flights of bombers carrying nuclear weapons beyond their national borders over the territories of other countries is no imagined, hypothetical or illusory threat, but the most real, the most actual threat of the present day.

Although we are told that the inhabitants of the Almeria coast have not suffered and have not received a dangerous amount of radioactive irradiation, this is, after all, the version of the United States command, which is doing everything in its power to hush up this whole affair and to make out that nothing dangerous has happened and that everything is perfectly all right. But it is too early to say this. The future will show whether everything is really all right. Only in the future shall we find out what effect all this has had on the local inhabitants of the Almeria region who were in the area where the American hydrogen bombs fell at the time of the B-52 accident.

The main point, however, is that this incident has proved that bombers carrying nuclear weapons can crash and that their trotyl detonators can explode. And if such

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flights continue, the time is bound to come when not only the trotyl but also the atomic detonator will explode, and consequently there will be a nuclear or thermo-nuclear explosion with all its appalling consequences.

How long will the American strategists of the Pentagon and of NATO, who speculate on such false premises, be allowed to continue to keep their nuclear bombs, including multi-megaton hydrogen bombs, hanging in the air over the heads of European peoples and the peoples of other continents? After all, this nuclear psychosis, this nuclear paranoia of the Pentagon can go on for years. And during that period there is sure to occur more than one catastrophic incident with these bombs, and thousands and thousands of people will perish.

As the Almeria incident has shown, the question of flights of bombers carrying nuclear weapons is not a question affecting only the USSR and the United States, as some people may think. Indeed not; this is a question affecting the security of all those over whose heads this deadly load flies. It was only by a stroke of luck that the crash of the United States nuclear bomber which took place in Europe over Spanish territory did not result in the explosion of the hydrogen bombs that were on board, with all the monstrous and irreparable consequences for the population of that area. If it had done so, one can only imagine what would have remained of Almeria, Cartagena, Murcia, Seville, Cordoba, Alicante and dozens of other towns and many dozens or even hundreds of villages in Spain. To ignore this fact now and not to draw the absolutely essential conclusions from it would be unforgivable levity and irresponsibility in regard to the safety of the peoples of Europe and the peoples of other parts of the globe where such exceedingly dangerous and provocative demonstrations are being carried out with hydrogen bombs.

The peoples of Europe and the peoples of other parts of the world must not be, and have no right to be, fatalistically passive or careless where their own safety is concerned! Once again we submit to the members of the Committee our most insistent proposal that they consider the question of addressing an appeal to the countries concerned immediately to discontinue flights of bombers carrying nuclear weapons beyond their national borders. Even in the United States itself, its statesmen have more than once drawn attention to the danger of the outbreak of war as a result of

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miscalculation, error or accident. Flights of United States aircraft carrying nuclear weapons involve that very danger. The urgent need to prevent dangerous accidents and incidents which might entail grave consequences for the peoples, as well as the interests of peace, call for the immediate discontinuance of flights of aircraft carrying nuclear weapons beyond national borders and for the strict observance of international agreements prohibiting the radioactive contamination of man's environment.

We deemed it necessary to dwell in some detail on this question because the incident of the falling of American multimegaton hydrogen bombs over the southern Mediterranean coast of Spain is clearly a danger-signal. This is not the signal of a false danger, an academic danger, but a real warning to all of you. No one can ignore this signal, for when the catastrophe comes it will be too late to react. Action must be taken immediately to solve this problem. Everyone must draw the necessary serious conclusions from this, here and now. What we should do in this Committee is to address an appeal to the countries concerned immediately to discontinue flights of their aircraft carrying nuclear weapons beyond the limits of their national borders.

Another of the important measures aimed at limiting the danger of a nuclear war and reducing the arms race is the establishment of denuclearized zones in various regions of the world. An overwhelming majority agrees that the establishment of such zones would help towards preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. This aspect of the matter was stressed by the majority of speakers at the twentieth session of the United Nations General Assembly when the question of the establishment of a denuclearized zone in Africa was discussed. The twentieth session of the General Assembly adopted by an overwhelming majority a declaration proclaiming Africa a nuclear-free zone (A/RES/2033 (XX); ENDC/162).

The Soviet Union emphatically advocates the establishment of denuclearized zones in Africa, Europe and other regions of the world. The Soviet Government fully supports the proposal of the Polish People's Republic (ENDC/C.1/1; PV.189, p.6) to establish a denuclearized zone in central Europe. The Soviet Union also supports the proposals made by the Government of the German Democratic Republic to the Government of

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the Federal Republic of Germany, as well as the appeal of the Government of the German Democratic Republic calling upon the nuclear Powers, "in so far as they have nuclear weapons on German soil, to withdraw these nuclear weapons from German territory and in future keep it free of nuclear weapons". (ENDC/168, p.5).

In advocating the establishment of denuclearized zones in various regions of the world, the Soviet Union understands it to mean that the establishment of such zones should involve the elimination in those regions of military bases which could be used for the location of nuclear weapons. It is quite obvious that the transformation of Africa into a denuclearized zone presupposes the elimination of all foreign military bases on the African continent. Such an approach meets with wide support from States which advocate the elimination of foreign military bases and the removal of all loop-holes which could nullify the implementation of decisions to establish zones free of nuclear weapons. We should like once again to point out that the Soviet Government is willing to assume an obligation to respect the status of the denuclearized zones to be set up, if the other nuclear Powers assume the same obligations.

I now come to the question of the cessation of underground nuclear weapon tests. As far as can be judged from the statements made by the representatives of many States who have spoken at the twentieth session of the United Nations General Assembly, as well as here at the present session of the Committee, the question of prohibiting underground nuclear tests is causing concern to many governments and peoples. Everyone realizes that the prohibition of such tests would be a very substantial obstacle to the further improvement of nuclear weapons, and that consequently it would prevent equipment of the arsenals of the nuclear Powers with new and even more destructive types of weapons of mass destruction. Apart from this, the prohibition of underground nuclear tests could definitively shut off the possibilities of conducting experiments with nuclear weapons from those States which are now thinking of starting to manufacture them. Thus to a certain extent the cessation of nuclear weapon tests could also help towards solving the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

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It is well known that the Moscow Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1) is of a partial nature and that after its conclusion the problem of banning underground nuclear explosions remained unsolved. Even in 1963, however, the Soviet Union was prepared to include also this latter category of nuclear tests in the Moscow Treaty. The Soviet Union declared at that time that, for control over the observance of an agreement on the prohibition of underground nuclear tests, the national means of detecting and identifying underground seismic events which States had at their disposal were quite adequate. We still adhere to this view today. The facts which followed the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty have merely confirmed this Soviet point of view. The Soviet Union is prepared to sign immediately an agreement which would extend the Moscow Treaty to cover underground nuclear tests.

The Western Powers, especially the United States, maintain a different position on the question of the cessation of underground tests. They still insist on the establishment of international control and the carrying out of international inspection in order to verify the observance of an agreement on this question. It is this eight-year-old position of the Western Powers that has in fact led the solution of this question into a deadlock. One may well ask who stands to gain by such a situation. Obviously it is those circles which are interested in continuing the testing of new types of nuclear weapons -- that is, the United States first and foremost.

A short while ago we perused some communications concerning the latest annual report of the United States Atomic Energy Commission which was submitted at the end of January this year to the United States Congress. It is evident from this report that those in the United States who are connected with the fabrication of nuclear weapons need to carry out further underground nuclear tests. Thus the report notes with satisfaction the successful execution of the "energetic" programme of underground nuclear tests which was commenced after the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty in 1963. The report indicates that, as a result of the development of "improved testing devices", the Commission was able to carry out weapon tests underground which were previously considered only possible in the atmosphere. Furthermore, by way of conclusion, the Commission indicates that "new tests are presently being prepared".

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Three days ago -- on 5 March -- the Atomic Energy Commission announced in Washington that it had carried out a further nuclear test explosion in Nevada. This was, as reported in the press, the sixth nuclear explosion this year within two months. It is obvious to everyone that the directors of the United States atomic programme intend to continue testing new types of nuclear weapons underground. This explains why the United States is not prepared to settle the question of prohibiting underground nuclear tests under the terms of the Moscow Treaty and continues to insist on the old demand for international inspection, although it realizes perfectly well that this demand is precisely what prevents agreement on the prohibition of underground nuclear tests.

To solve the problem of prohibiting underground nuclear tests, there is now no need to seek any other way than that already opened by the 1963 Moscow Treaty. The Soviet Union is prepared to reach such agreement and, as soon as the United States abandons the unacceptable demand for international inspection, the way to an agreement on the prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests will be open.

The Soviet Union supports the proposal to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Government has repeatedly proposed that the nuclear Powers should assume an obligation not to use nuclear weapons. In putting forward that proposal the Soviet Government also took into account the fact that the achievement of an agreement to renounce the use of nuclear weapons is facilitated by the circumstance that this measure does not require either the establishment of any form of control or any material expenditure. The vital importance and practical nature of agreements of this kind have already been confirmed by recent historic examples in which similar agreements concerning other types of weapons of mass destruction played a definite part.

The tremendous danger to mankind inherent in atomic weapons is widely realized throughout the world. It has also been reflected in the recent decrees of the Second Vatican Ecumenical Council, in which in particular the following is noted:

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"The horror and perversity of war are immensely magnified by the addition of new scientific weapons. For acts of war involving these weapons can inflict massive and indiscriminate destruction, thus going far beyond the bounds of legitimate defense. Indeed, if the kind of instruments which can now be found in the armories of the great nations were to be employed to their fullest, an almost total and altogether reciprocal slaughter of each side by the other would follow, not to mention the widespread devastation that would take place in the world and the deadly after-effects that would be spawned by the use of weapons of this kind." (New York Times, 9 December 1965, p.21).

The idea of prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons is now being widely supported by the peoples and the majority of States throughout the world. An important landmark in this respect is the Declaration, adopted on the initiative of Ethiopia and other States of Africa and Asia with the support of the socialist countries at the sixteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly in 1961, on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons. The Declaration proclaims that the use of such weapons "is contrary to the spirit, letter and aims of the United Nations" and that -

"Any State using nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons is to be considered as violating the Charter of the United Nations, as acting contrary to the laws of humanity and as committing a crime against mankind and civilization."
(A/RES/1653 (XVI))

The Declaration, as is well known, provided for the convening of a special conference for signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons. Within as well as outside the United Nations a campaign has been carried on for the convening of an international conference for the signing of a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons. Many States have spoken in support of it. Most members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee have also spoken in favour of convening such a conference as quickly as possible.

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All attempts, however, to ensure the solution of the question of prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons come up against the stubborn resistance of the Western Powers, headed by the United States, which do not wish to give up their plans for a nuclear war and which wish to rely on nuclear weapons also in the future in carrying out their aggressive policies. The refusal of the Western Powers to conclude an agreement renouncing the use of nuclear weapons shows quite clearly that the ruling circles of the United States and of other Western Powers count on the use of nuclear weapons for carrying out their imperialistic policy from a position of strength, in particular against the national liberation movements of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

This is shown by the fact that at the sixteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly the United States and the United Kingdom voted against adoption of the Declaration on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons. The NATO Powers maintain the same position in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, obstructing in every possible way the solution of this vital and urgent question.

The Soviet Union believes that the signing of a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons would be an important step towards eliminating the threat of a nuclear war and towards reducing international tension, curbing the arms race and strengthening confidence in relations between States. The signing of such a convention would be an important step towards the complete prohibition and complete elimination of nuclear weapons and towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament. Moreover, even before the conclusion of such a convention the Soviet Union is prepared immediately to assume an obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons provided that the other nuclear Powers do likewise.

The message from the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Kosygin, to the Eighteen-Nation Committee states that, in order really to put an end of the danger of a nuclear war and to the nuclear armaments race, the Soviet Government proposes that the nuclear Powers should consider the question of carrying out immediately the programme relating to nuclear disarmament. Such disarmament must provide for the destruction, under appropriate international control, of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons accumulated by States, the prohibition of their manufacture, the complete destruction of all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and the prohibition of their production, and the elimination of military bases in foreign territories.

(ENDC/167, p.4).

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The demand for the prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons is the core of all the Soviet proposals on disarmament questions which the Soviet Government has been putting forward throughout the whole period since the Second World War. Moreover, the Soviet proposals are aimed both at an independent solution of the question of prohibiting nuclear weapons and at its solution within the framework of the problem of general and complete disarmament, which provides for the total elimination of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles. The implementation of all these measures of nuclear disarmament -- which, incidentally, do not give any of the parties concerned any military advantages -- would really rid the peoples of the threat of a nuclear war.

The United States proposal (ENDC/120) for a cut-off of production of fissionable materials with the simultaneous destruction by the Soviet Union and the United States of a certain number of nuclear bombs and missiles (ENDC/172) does not achieve this aim, nor is it intended to do so. The United States proposal (ENDC/165) that the United States and the USSR should carry out "the demonstrated destruction of thousands of nuclear weapons" in order to transfer the fissionable materials obtained from them to peaceful purposes is not in principle a new proposal. It is a modification of the old proposal (ENDC/PV.151, p.12) for the transfer from the stockpiles of the Soviet Union and the United States of 40 and 60 tons respectively of U-235 to peaceful purposes. That proposal was criticized by us as having nothing to do with the problem of disarmament and as not in any way reducing the threat of a nuclear catastrophe. Now we are being offered the same goods but in a new package.

Indeed, a superficial examination of this "new" proposal might give some people the impression that it is constructive, since it speaks about destroying a certain number of nuclear warheads or bombs. In actual fact all this is far from being the case. The whole secret is that the United States proposal is not at all intended to reduce the United States stockpiles of nuclear weapons; it is designed to get rid of old stocks of obsolete types so as to replace them with improved types and, it is to be assumed, not in smaller but in considerably larger quantities. It is well known that the United States, since the end of the three-year moratorium (since 15 September 1961), has carried out more than 150 underground nuclear tests, approximately one-half

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of these after the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty on 5 August 1963. It is not difficult to surmise that as a result of all these tests there have emerged in the United States improved types of nuclear weapons surpassing those now kept in United States depots.

Anyone can read this between the lines of the reports of the United States Atomic Energy Commission. In his message to Congress on defence matters the United States President, Mr. Johnson, wrote at the beginning of last year that, if his country was to remain strong, outmoded weapons must be replaced by new ones. It is precisely this recommendation of President Johnson that is being followed in the United States proposal for the "demonstrated destruction" of nuclear weapons, which is being passed off here as a radical measure allegedly aimed at reducing stockpiles of nuclear armaments.

This is an old device. Everyone remembers the United States proposal for the destruction of the B-47 and TU-16 bombers (ENDC/PV.176). Then, as now, the United States representatives tried to pass off here the destruction of the obsolete B-47 aircraft as a disarmament measure. But what in fact happened? Regardless of the course of the debate on this question in the Committee, the B-47 bombers in the United States were being gradually removed from the armoury and replaced by other, new types of aircraft, mainly strategic missiles; and by now the United States Air Force has only a few dozen B-47 bombers, which are to be destroyed by the middle of this year.

It is interesting to note that, by the time the United States submitted its proposal, the number of B-47 bombers compared to the original figure had been reduced by one-half. Thus the United States has been eliminating its B-47 bombers; but does this mean that it has taken the path towards disarmament and that it has reduced its armaments? No, not at all. In the same message to the United States Congress, President Johnson wrote that in the last four years the United States strategic nuclear forces had increased threefold. That is what the destruction of obsolete bombers presented to the world. Can we expect anything different from the destruction of obsolete United States nuclear warheads and bombs? We are convinced that we cannot. The question can be solved only in the context of the total destruction of all delivery vehicles and the total destruction of nuclear weapons.

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In conclusion, I should like to say a few words about the reduction of military budgets. The Soviet Government has repeatedly put forward a proposal to reduce the military budgets of States, pointing out that this measure would not only limit the possibility of extending the arms race but would also release considerable resources for developing peaceful sectors of the economy and for increasing the well-being of the peoples.

The representatives of the Western Powers talk a good deal about their intentions to limit the arms race. However, one has only to take a look at the state of the military budgets of the Western Powers, especially that of the United States, to see the real attitude of these States towards disarmament and the actual content of their policies.

The facts show that the United States is bent, not on reducing its military budget, but on carrying out a colossal new inflation of its military budget and on intensifying its military preparations. Thus in January this year the United States Government asked Congress for \$60,500 million, 53.6 per cent of the Government's total expenditures for military purposes for the coming financial year. A large portion of these expenditures is assigned to the aggressive war in Viet-Nam. Even in this financial year expenditures on the war in Viet-Nam will represent, according to preliminary estimates, \$4,600 million; in the next financial year, 1966-1967, they will increase to \$10,000 million or even more. The more than twofold increase in appropriations for the war in Viet-Nam testifies to the United States' intention to continue and to expand this war; this will obviously aggravate the international situation still further and, of course, does not testify that the United States is heading towards disarmament.

Furthermore, the United States already has plans, or is working plans out, for military preparations and military production for many years ahead. It is well known that, in accordance with a decision of the United States Congress taken in August 1965, the number of the United States armed forces is to increase by September 1966 to the unprecedented peace-time figure of 2,980,000 -- virtually 3,000,000 men. The United States Under-Secretary of the Army, Mr. Stanley Resor, has stated that during the next five years -- you see, they are already planning five years ahead -- \$20,000 million will be spent on constructing new military equipment.

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The United States magazine U.S. News and World Report wrote that such expenditures would be a record for peacetime; they exceeded even the average level of expenditures on the Army during the three years of the Korean War. In the United States, plans are being discussed which are connected with military preparations, with the growth and development of the arms race, over a period already covering even the 1970's.

Those are a few facts which, of course, by no means testify to any aspiration or desire of the United States to follow the path of disarmament; nor do they in any way testify to a United States intention to reach agreement on the question of reducing the military budgets of States.

The elaboration of measures for reducing the military budgets of States remains one of the important tasks of our Committee. The fact that so far we here have not been able to reach any agreement about reducing the military budgets of States although several years ago, upon the Soviet Union's initiative, some steps were taken in that direction, convincingly demonstrates that the forces of militarism do in fact direct and control the policy of the United States.

Agreement on the adoption of constructive measures in regard to the questions we have mentioned would be an indication of a positive turn for the better in the work of the Committee for which everyone is anxiously waiting. The Soviet delegation appeals to all the participants in the negotiations to examine thoroughly the partial measures we have mentioned and to make efforts to achieve progress towards bringing about their speediest possible accomplishment.

Mr. FISHER (United States of America): At the outset I should like to say that we have taken note of the extremely interesting suggestions made by our first speaker this morning, the representative of Mexico. We shall, of course, give them the most careful study. I should also like to acknowledge his kind words of welcome.

I have listened with care and attention, as I always do, to the statement made by the Soviet representative. I have not found in it anything that is new or helpful, either in respect to his suggestions or in respect to what appeared to me to be the propaganda aspects of his statement. With the greatest respect, I feel I must comment now on two aspects of his statement, because they appear to us to be particularly unhelpful to the work of this Committee, the purpose of which is to reach agreements which will advance the cause of peace.

(Mr. Fisher, United States)

The Soviet representative made a statement today on foreign bases. Let me deal with this point quickly by repeating what my delegation has previously said in this regard. We have pointed out that adoption of the Soviet proposal would impair the right of individual and collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter; that by forbidding smaller or weaker nations to protect themselves by arrangements with other nations the Soviet proposal would leave them vulnerable to that form of aggression which the communists now call "wars of national liberation".

The Soviet representative also spoke of the unfortunate accident over the coast of Spain. I am sorry that he has seen fit to raise this issue a third time here. In our view -- and I say this with regret -- his purpose is clear. The Soviet Government must have been aware, or could easily have ascertained, that no nuclear weapon test, no nuclear explosion of any kind and no radioactive pollution of the sea were involved. Therefore there can be no question of violation of the limited test-ban Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1). The Soviet representative had some rather unflattering things to say about the aide-mémoire of the United States. They were so unflattering that I was forced to the conclusion that he had not read it. I should therefore like to read out the operative portion of that section on which he commented:

"The Government of the USSR must be aware --- or could easily have ascertained -- that no nuclear weapon test, no nuclear explosion of any kind, and no radioactive pollution of the sea were involved in the unfortunate accident over the coast of Spain. Consequently, there is no question of a 'violation' or of 'actions in conflict with' either the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, or of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas, or of the principle of freedom of the high seas. Accusations to this effect by the Soviet Government are therefore without any foundation."

(ENDC/170)

Nor do any of the other Soviet charges have any validity. Indeed, the Soviet Union's sudden concern about radioactivity of the ground outside its borders seems somewhat surprising in the light of its massive resumption of atmospheric tests in 1961, for those tests released more radioactivity than all previous Western tests combined. The Soviet Union has apparently again distorted the meaning of international treaties to suit the purpose of a propaganda campaign. If the Soviet

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Government had been genuinely concerned about possible violations of international agreements and international law, it would have requested and awaited a reply in clarification from the United States Government instead of resorting to tactics designed to advance purely propaganda objectives.

As the United States has pointed out on previous occasions, the bomber accident in Spain, unfortunate though it was, did not involve any of the lurid dangers that the Soviet representative has portrayed. There was no explosion of a nuclear weapon; and I must respectfully dissent from the Soviet representative's characterization of this fact as a "stroke of luck". It was due to the safety devices which the United States has built into all its nuclear weapons and all its nuclear deterrent. I wish we could be sure that similar safety devices were incorporated in those of other countries.

That ends my observations on this aspect of the Soviet representative's statement. I shall, of course, read his statement carefully -- as I do all the statements of the Soviet representative -- and perhaps comment on other aspects at an appropriate time.

I should like now to turn to what I hope is a more fruitful subject and to propose that this Committee give detailed consideration to the proposal made by President Johnson in his message to this Conference (ENDC/165) that we agree first to the demonstrated destruction of thousands of nuclear weapons by the United States and the Soviet Union; second, to the transfer to peaceful purposes under international safeguards of the large quantities of fissionable material obtained from this destruction; and third, to a verified halt in the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. Earlier in his statement this morning I heard our Soviet colleague giving a description of what I suppose was this proposal, but frankly I did not recognize it. I can only come to the conclusion that we have not presented the proposal properly, and for that reason I should like to recommend that we pause for a moment to consider its implications.

We at this Conference are aware of the destructive power of even one nuclear weapon. Under this proposal thousands of such weapons would be withdrawn from the stockpiles of the United States and the Soviet Union and destroyed so that they could never be employed in their death-dealing mission.

We at this Conference are aware of the needs of mankind for the use of fissionable material for peaceful purposes. Under this proposal the fissionable material taken from those weapons would be set aside under international safeguards

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for the benefit of mankind. As I have indicated, we are prepared to transfer 60,000 kilograms of U-235 to peaceful uses if the Soviet Union will transfer 40,000 kilograms of the same material. We can obtain some idea of the significance of this proposal if we realize that this total amount of U-235, fully fissioned, would produce an amount of electric power equal to the present power requirements over a period of seven years of the eight non-aligned States represented round this table.

We at this Conference are aware of the danger to mankind from increasing stockpiles of nuclear weapons. Under our proposal there would be a reduction in the stockpiles of nuclear weapons. Perhaps I have not made it clear in discussing this proposal that the 60,000 kilograms of U-235 taken from those weapons to be destroyed by the United States -- and the 40,000 kilograms taken from those weapons to be destroyed by the Soviet Union, if it were to agree to this proposal -- would not be available for refabrication. This involves a total of 100,000 kilograms of U-235 to be taken from weapons and put under international safeguards to peaceful purposes. Those grim factories which might otherwise be turning out the fissionable material to build up these stockpiles would be either forever stilled or permitted to produce only fissionable material which was not to be used for weapons purposes.

The proposition that this does not involve real reduction in armaments seems to me to be doubtful as a question of mathematics and, even more so, as a question of nuclear physics. The weapons are destroyed, the materials from them are put to peaceful uses, and the grim factories that might manufacture replacements for those materials are either stilled or converted to producing material which would not be used in weapons. Of course, we know that even after a reduction of this magnitude in nuclear stockpiles the amounts remaining will still be very large; but we shall have made a substantial start in reducing them. We shall have shown to the nations of the world, particularly the non-nuclear weapon nations, that while we are trying to reach an agreement under which they forswear nuclear weapons, the nuclear Powers are also prepared not only to stop building up their vast stockpiles of these weapons but to take steps towards reducing them.

Earlier in this session of the Conference the United States indicated (ENDC/PV.241, p.37) why we should not condition the entry into force of a non-proliferation treaty upon other measures which have been proposed to halt the nuclear arms race. However, as I stated on Thursday last (ENDC/PV.245), the United States

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has long recognized that a programme of related measures is required if we are to halt the arms race in nuclear weapons, not just for the moment, but lastingly. If we are to make progress on these related measures, we must begin to work on them now in the same detail as we are working on the non-proliferation treaty.

We should bear in mind that, when we speak of halting and turning back the arms race in nuclear weapons, we should be concerned with at least two aspects of this race. The world's build-up in nuclear weapons proceeds both qualitatively, that is, by improving the effectiveness of such weapons through continued testing; and quantitatively, that is, by increasing the number of such weapons by continued production of fissionable material for use in nuclear weapons.

We have, of course, put a real curb on the qualitative aspect of the arms race in nuclear weapons by agreeing to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water. In particular, this treaty is a real curb on the development of nuclear weapons in the higher yield ranges, weapons of almost unbelievable destructive capability.

The United States would, of course, like to go further and halt the qualitative aspect of the arms race in nuclear weapons by extending the limited test ban to cover underground nuclear tests. For such an extension the United States will require only the number and kind of inspections which modern science shows to be necessary to assure that such a treaty is being faithfully observed.

I do not believe that it would be useful for the work of our Conference to engage in recriminations as to where lies the responsibility for our not having been able to agree on a comprehensive test ban. What we think is needed, of course, is a willingness on the part of the Soviet Government to concede the need to assure adequate verification. This morning we have heard an expression of a somewhat different view. At the same time, however, we feel that we should not limit our effort to halt the build-up of nuclear weapons to only one of its dimensions. We should also attempt to curb the quantitative aspect of the arms race in nuclear weapons by halting the build-up of nuclear arsenals and destroying large numbers of weapons presently in stockpile. Indeed, the limitation of the further production of nuclear weapons by halting the production of the weapons grade fissionable material that is the essential element of their manufacture is the measure most "germane" to a non-proliferation effort, if I may borrow the phrase used by the representative of Sweden in her interesting statement at our meeting on 24 February (ENDC/PV.243, p.10).

(Mr. Fisher, United States)

Let us first consider the proposal for the cessation of the production of fissionable material for use in weapons. I believe we should consider it first because, as a matter of common sense, agreement on it is necessary for agreement to be possible on the other portions of the measure. It would not make a great deal of sense to destroy nuclear weapons and place into peaceful uses the fissionable materials obtained from them if both sides were still turning out vast quantities of fissionable material for use in weapons.

The United States has submitted to this Conference a working paper (ENDC/134) in which it has developed its verification concepts for a cut-off of fissionable materials produced for weapons purposes. With the permission of the Committee, I should like to emphasize the key elements of this approach as it would apply to the facilities that might be covered.

Facilities that would be declared and subject to inspection would be of three types -- isotope separation plants, reactors, and chemical separation plants.

First, isotope separation plants would be either shut down or permitted to produce for purposes other than for use in weapons. The monitoring of a shut-down plant can be accomplished by access to the outside of the plant -- including the ability to walk around the outside of the process buildings -- and the ability to observe the power input to the plant. In the case of a plant which continues in production, it will also be necessary to observe the input of materials to the plant, and the output from the plant, including the residue.

Second, reactors would also be either shut down or continued in operation for the purpose of creating material not to be used in weapons. With respect to the shut-down reactors, we have worked out a method by which this can be verified merely by periodic inspection, without the necessity of having a permanent inspector resident at the shut-down plant. As for those reactors operated for power production or for production of nuclear materials for purposes other than use in weapons, International Atomic Energy Agency or equivalent safeguards would be applied to all non-military power reactors, starting with those rated above about 100 thermal megawatts.

Third, chemical separation plants would be subject to inspection procedures. Because of the nature of their operations, continued access to these plants would be required. These inspection procedures would be for the purpose of verifying the amounts of plutonium produced in power reactors as well as the amounts of fissionable materials utilized in other reactors.

(Mr. Fisher, United States)

The verification system that I have described applies to declared facilities. It is of course necessary to have a limited number of inspections of suspected undeclared facilities. These could be conducted under arrangements which would provide reasonable assurance that no prohibited activities were occurring and which would protect any sensitive facility from unnecessary observation.

As part of this measure the United States proposes that, as I have indicated earlier, the 60,000 kg and 40,000 kg of weapons grade U-235 which the United States and the Soviet Union respectively would agree to transfer to peaceful purposes should come from the demonstrated destruction of nuclear weapons from the stockpiles of the two countries. This suggestion was first made last autumn (A/PV.1334, p.37) by Ambassador Goldberg, who, we should note, has been with us during our deliberations today. The United States was gratified at the very considerable interest shown by delegations at the United Nations in the United States proposal for destruction of nuclear weapons. In this Committee the representative of the United Arab Republic also welcomed, on 27 January (ENDC/PV.235, pp.39,40), this United States proposal and expressed hope that we would develop it. Notwithstanding some rather discouraging observations which have been made about it earlier this morning -- perhaps even because of those observations, -- I shall be happy to do so now, since my remarks may dispel some of the concern which has been expressed.

We have referred to this new United States proposal as the "demonstrated" destruction of nuclear weapons. By "demonstrated" we mean that the physical destruction of the nuclear weapons must be conducted in a manner providing assurances that the weapons really were destroyed, yet without in any way compromising design information affecting the national security of the participants and without disseminating any information which could lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology. To accomplish this objective, the nuclear weapons to be destroyed would be transported to designated depots for disassembly, removal of the fissionable material, and destruction of the remaining components. Such depots could be on the territory of the nation owning the weapons. The destruction of these weapons would be demonstrated to nationals of both parties and to neutral observers.

The precise demonstration procedures to be used would of course have to be agreed upon in negotiations. Our present thinking is based on the concept of visual observation of the weapons introduced into the destruction area and upon an assay of the fissionable materials leaving the destruction area. Inspectors would not have access to the destruction area during the actual destruction process.

(Mr. Fisher, United States)

Under this proposal each nation would determine the particular nuclear weapons to be destroyed in order to obtain the fissionable material that it was to transfer to peaceful purposes. And here I should repeat that the weapons material, the U-235, is to be transferred to peaceful purposes; it will not be available for refabrication. Obviously, the numbers of weapons destroyed will depend on the types of weapons selected. Nevertheless, the large number of actual weapons which would have to be destroyed in order to obtain the suggested amounts of fissionable material would be very significant.

Up to now we have talked only about U-235, but, if the Soviet Union would agree, the United States is also prepared to transfer to peaceful uses the plutonium obtained from the destroyed weapons. The actual amounts of plutonium to be transferred, however, would have to be determined during the negotiations.

The United States proposal for a cut-off of fissionable materials production, destruction of nuclear weapons, and transfer of fissionable materials to peaceful uses is addressed primarily to the Soviet Union. But we are also most anxious to have the views of other delegations, and particularly of those which have insisted on the need to reduce existing nuclear arsenals. This is a proposal that does just that. In order to facilitate study of the weapons destruction aspect of the United States cut-off proposal, the United States delegation is today submitting a brief working paper on the subject, entitled "Transfer of Fissionable Material Obtained by the Destruction of Nuclear Weapons". We ask that it be circulated as a Conference document.^{1/}

In the past, when the United States has made reasonable and practical proposals to turn back the arms race, the response of our Soviet colleague has unhappily often been to counter with an offer which would be appropriate only if we were in the third stage of general and complete disarmament, involving all the development of peace-keeping machinery and all the changed political environment that that would imply. When the United States proposed the destruction of a limited number of bombers, the response was, "Let us instead destroy all bombers". When the United States originally proposed the exploration of a freeze in the number and characteristics of strategic nuclear delivery systems, the response was, "Let us instead destroy all nuclear delivery systems" -- although here an exception was made with regard to a slight but unexplained remainder which was to be left over to make up the Gromyko "umbrella".

^{1/} Circulated as document ENDC/172.

(Mr. Fisher, United States)

It is with the greatest regret that I have heard our Soviet colleague follow this pattern today; apparently disregarding any reasonable effort to limit and reduce the stockpile of nuclear weapons, he says, "Let us instead destroy all nuclear weapons". We must be realistic here at this negotiating table, for we are dealing with the real world. Does anyone really believe that the Soviet Union or the United States could or would, in the world as it is today, agree upon and proceed now to the elimination, at one fell swoop, of the totality of their respective nuclear arsenals? I think that, when we consider this, we shall all agree that this is quite unlikely.

The simple and evident truth -- and I must ask the Committee to bear with me if I repeat it again -- is that we must take first steps before we take the last ones, and that we do not advance our work here if we look so hard at ultimate solutions that we neglect doing what is necessary and possible now.

The United States is proposing a measure which is highly germane to our efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

The United States is proposing a measure which makes the largest possible use of existing international institutions for its verification.

The United States is proposing a measure which could be put into effect now, in today's political climate.

The United States hopes that its proposal will be studied in the light of those considerations.

The CHAIRMAN (Italy) (translation from French): If no other delegation wishes to speak, I should like to make a few very brief remarks in my capacity as representative for Italy.

My delegation also intends to speak on the problem of collateral measures at our next meeting, when it will put forward more comprehensive and detailed comments on the interesting statements we have heard today.

Since, however, the delegation of the Soviet Union has spoken at length on a subject which I think directly concerns the problem of surprise attacks, I should like to remind the Committee that in previous sessions of our Conference the Western delegations, and particularly that of Italy, have several times stressed the fact that we should devise steps against such attacks. Unfortunately the Soviet delegation has always refused to engage in such a discussion and has declared that all the proposals put forward in this connexion by the Western delegations were simply forms

(The Chairman, Italy)

of espionage and therefore totally unacceptable. If the West still needs to take precautions against surprise attacks, the responsibility for these arrangements lies not with the Western alliance but with those who hitherto have prevented or rejected any agreement about such attacks.

The Soviet representative has spoken in the severest terms about the precautions the West is forced to take against surprise attacks; but I should like to ask the Soviet delegation whether the Soviet Union does not take similar precautions, involving technical and inevitably nuclear methods, to protect itself and its allies against any danger of surprise attack from the West. If the answer is yes, why does the Soviet Union reproach the West so bitterly for doing the same thing? If the answer is no, the Soviet Union obviously sees no source of danger in the West and recognizes our peaceful intentions. Why then does the Soviet delegation talk in such severe and alarming terms of the hysteria of the Pentagon and of the West's aggressive and highly dangerous intentions?

For our part, we should be very glad if it were possible to resume constructive and effective negotiations here on steps against surprise attacks. These form part of the collateral measures referred to on our agenda. We should be very glad if such negotiations could be resumed with a view to concluding suitable agreements guaranteeing all countries against surprise attacks and making it possible to do away once and for all with the technical devices which not only one side but certainly the other as well unfortunately need at present to protect themselves against such a disaster.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 246th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador Francesco Cavalletti, representative of Italy.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Mexico, the Soviet Union, the United States and Italy.

"The delegation of the United States tabled a working paper on transfer of fissionable material obtained by the destruction of nuclear weapons.^{1/}

The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 10 March 1966, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.50 p.m.